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controlling the use of corn rootworm insecticides. The farm modeled is for Chickasaw County, Iowa. Results
show significant opportunities for coordinating agricultural commodity and environmental policies. Corn
rootworm insecticide use can be reduced with only modest effects.
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Agricultural Economics | Economics | Environmental Policy
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/164
Flexibility and the Integration of 
Commodity and Environmental Policies 
Eli Feinerman, Derald Holtkamp, 
and S.R. Johnson 
Working Paper 93-WP 117 
October 1993 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 
Ames, lA 50011 USA 
Eli Feinerman is a visiting associate professor of economics, CARD, and professor of agricultural economics, 
Hebrew University, Rehovot, Israel; Derald Holtkamp is a former CARD research associate; and S. R. Johnson 
is C. F. Curtiss Distinguished Professor of Agriculture and director of CARD. The authors gratefully 
acknowledge Jon Tollefson for his contributions of field data and helpful suggestions. Also, thanks go to Todd 
Campbell and Mark Siemers for their technical assistance in the operation of the models. 
Prepared under Cooperative Agreement Number CR816099-0l-l between the Office of Policy Analysis, U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, D.C., and the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, 
Iowa State University. 
ABSTRACT 
Envirorunental and health risk concerns associated with the use of agricultural chemicals in 
the United States are increasing. In response, public policies designed to alter farming practices and 
the use of agricultural chemicals are being proposed and implemented. In addition, agricultural price 
stabilization and income support policies are being reviewed for envirorunental implications. This 
paper provides a farm-level analysis of the interrelationships between the current U.S. commodity 
program for corn and selected policies for controlling the use of corn rootworrn insecticides. The 
farm modeled is for Chickasaw County, Iowa. Results show significant opportunities for coordinating 
agricultural commodity and envirorunental policies. Corn rootworrn insecticide use can be reduced 
with only modest effects on certain equivalent farm income. 
FLEXIBILITY AND THE INTEGRATION OF 
COMMODITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES 
There is broad evidence of increased concern for environmental and health risks associated 
with the use of chemicals in U.S. agriculture (Council on Environmental Quality 1991; Batie 1987; 
Hoyer et al. 1987). Regulating powers of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) are 
being extended through re-registration of pesticides, drinking water standards, and other measures. 
Also, states are enacting laws limiting the use of agricultural chemicals, providing funding for 
research on alternative less chemically dependent cultivation practices, monitoring groundwater 
quality, and assessing health risks (Wise and Johnson 1990). It is somewhat surprising that the 
regulation of agricultural chemicals has progressed to the present point, without more comprehensive 
analyses of the interrelationships of chemical use, agricultural commodity programs for price 
stabilization and income support, and farm-level decisions (CARD and USEPA 1989). 
The triple-base of the Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act of 1990-FACTA 90 
-continued a trend toward flexibility that was initiated with the Food Security Act of 1985-FSA85 
(Glaser 1986). The triple-base provision for commodities with target prices permits participating 
producers to plant 15 percent of their program base in an alternative crop in return for forfeiting the 
associated deficiency payment. The result is producer decisions at the margin are based on market, 
not policy, prices. Government cost reduction, increased producer discretion, and environmental 
concerns were the three major arguments for the introduction of the triple-base. 
Environmental policies for agriculture have had a contrasting trend. Conservation compliance 
and regulation of agricultural chemicals are examples of limitations in flexibility characteristic of 
environmental policy. The result of the combination of more flexible commodity policy and more 
restrictive environmental policy is the significant modification of the decision space for producers. 
The result will change environmental and economic performance for farms and the agricultural sector. 
Empirical assessments have been developed for the farm level impacts of U.S. agricultural 
commodity programs, extending the analysis to issues of uncertainty. Kramer and Pope (1981) 
analyzed commodity program participation using a stochastic dominance model for Kern County 
(California), demonstrating relationships among program parameters, risk attitudes, and farm size. 
Musser and Stamoulis (1981) evaluated commodity programs from the 1977 U.S. Farm Bill using a 
farm level quadratic risk programming model, and concluded that for risk averse Georgia farmers, 
commodity program participation dominated nonparticipation except at higher levels of expected net 
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returns. An early study by Scott and Baker (1972) used quadratic programming to analyze risk-return 
trade-offs for Illinois farms, endogenizing commodity program participation. 
Recently, farm-level studies have been expanded in scope, perhaps in response to concerns 
about environmental and commodity policy trade-offs. For example, Helms eta!. (1987) used a 
whole farm simulation model to relate impacts of producer preferences to participation in commodity 
programs to the adoption of tillage practices. They found that a combination of commodity program 
participation with minimum and no-till practices dominated other alternatives for a typical Utah farm. 
The integration of commodity program participation and adoption of soil conservation practices within 
a risk framework was studied by McSweeny and Kramer (1986). Trade-offs between farm-level soil 
loss and nutrient (nitrogen and phosphorous) loss were also examined. Their findings suggested that 
cross-compliance between commodity and environmental programs would lead risk averse southern 
. Virginia farmers to adopt improved soil and nutrient loss control practices. 
This paper illustrates the importance of flexible commodity programs in integrating 
environmental and commodity policies for agriculture. The analysis is at the farm level and for a ban 
and a tax on use of com root worm insecticide. Com root worm is ranked as the most important 
com insect pest in the Midwest (Foster eta!. 1986). In crop rotations with one or more years of com 
following com, rootworm infestation is a problem requiring insecticides or other forms of control. A 
stylized treatment of triple-base program is used, anticipating a continuation of the flexibility trend 
that began in the FSA85. The results show that flexibility in commodity policy is important to the 
maintenance of farm income for producers that must comply with restrictive environmental policies. 
The Integrated Modeling System 
The integrated modeling system is a specialized version of the Comprehensive Economic 
Environmental Policy Evaluation System (CEEPES) (CARD and USEPA 1989) developed by the 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) and Office of Policy Analysis/USEPA. A 
unique feature of CEEPES is the use of biological, geophysical, and phenological process models as a 
system that includes their integration with economic decision and policy models. For analysis of com 
rootworm insecticide regulation, and commodity program analysis, this system was specialized for 
farm-level decisions. The specialized version of CEEPES including policy, farm decision, and 
biological components is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Policy Component 
The policy component identifies the agricultural and environmental policy instruments and 
summarizes outcomes of key performance variables. The focus is on the interdependencies between 
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the current U.S. commodity program for com and alternative policies for regulating the use of com 
rootworm insecticides. Under the FACTA 90, price and income support and stabilization for com 
producers is provided through nonrecourse loans, deficiency payments, paid land diversions, and 
reduced acreage provisions (USHR 1990). The program parameters are set by the government prior 
to planting. Acreage eligible for enrollment in the program base is determined for each farm by a 
five-year moving average of acres planted plus set-aside under the program for com. Given this rule, 
a reduction of com acres planted and program idled in one year can reduce the base acres in the 
following year by one-fifth of the decrease. The base yield, used in the calculation of the deficiency 
payment, was frozen in the FSA85. 
Two policies for limiting the use of com rootworm insecticides were examined with the triple-
base. The first was a complete ban. The second was a tax on the use (purchase) of com rootworm 
insecticides levied on the producer. Flexibility in the commodity program was also examined as 
potentially reducing com rootworm insecticide use. The emphasis in the analysis is on the 
interdependencies between commodity and environmental policies and opportunities for "win-win" or 
near "win-win" outcomes from more coordinated policy actions. 
Biological Component 
The biological component used an existing physiological process model, the Erosion 
Productivity Impact Calculator (EPIC) (Williams eta!. 1984; Putman and Dyke 1987). EPIC is 
capable of simulating growth and yield for both annual and perennial plants, and can be operated in 
time steps by Julian day over an arbitrary number of years, permitting the simulation of crop 
rotations. This feature of EPIC was important for the analysis since diversified crop rotations are a 
way of controlling com rootworm infestation, and the triple-base makes this practice more 
economically attractive. EPIC requires input data (weather, crop, tillage, and soil parameters) 
available from standard secondary sources. 
For operating and calibrating EPIC, historical weather and actual yield data were utilized. 
Yields were simulated for commonly observed crop rotations. To account for com yield reductions 
due to corn rootworm infestation, EPIC was modified to reflect root damage. The ranges and 
probabilities of damage were deterntined from experimental data and consultation with entomology 
specialists at Iowa State University (Tollefson 1989). Thus, the biological component was used to 
provide simulated yield distributions for the selected rotations and com rootworm infestation levels. 
Actual weather data were used to estimate these distributions. 
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Fann-Level Decision Component 
The farm-level decision component used quadratic risk programming (QRP) to model 
producer behavior under uncertainty. The formulation incorporating the commodity program 
provisions is similar to that of McSweeny and Kramer (1986). In matrix notation the standard QRP 
model can be represented as 
MAX 1cr X - a xr E ¥1 xee.-- !'.! (I) 
subject to A K ,;; lz. (2) 
K ;;, o (3) 
where X is the vector of enterprise activity levels; ,!;; is the vector of expected net returns; E is the 
variance covariance matrix of net returns; a is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion; )2 is a vector 
of the resource endowments; and A is the matrix of input-output coefficients. The limitations for 
QRP are well known. However, the studies of Tsiang (1972), Levy and Markowitz (1979), and 
Meyer (1987) suggest that the mean-variance approach may closely approximate economic behavior 
based on a wider range of more plausible utility functions. 
Representative Farm 
The specialized version of CEEPES was applied to a 320 acre farm in Nashua, Iowa 
(Chickasaw County). Crops included in the farm level analysis were: com (C), soybeans (S), oats 
(0), and alfalfa hay (L) grown in typical rotations observed in Iowa. Five crop rotations were 
included: I) continuous com (CC); 2) com following soybeans (CS); 3) two years of com following 
one year of soybeans (CCS); 4) com followed by soybeans followed by another year of com followed 
by oats then alfalfa hay (CSCOL); and 5) com followed by oats followed by three years of alfalfa hay 
(COLLL). 
Rotations with one or more years of com following com were assumed to be subject to 
rootworm infestation in the absence of application of com rootworm insecticides. Following Foster et 
al. (1986), and after consulting with ISU entomologist J. Tollefson (1989), it was determined that 
com root damage could be assumed negligible in all crop sequences other than com following corn 
(i.e., the CC and CCS rotations). 
The option to participate in the government's commodity program for com was included. 
The opportunity to participate was packaged into a single activity that included mandatory paid land 
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diversion, short-term nonrecourse loans and deficiency payments in rerum for idling land under the 
acreage reduction program. Program participation was modeled as an activity separate from the 
production activities, but program and production activities are linked by constraints on planted acres 
when program participation was selected. The constraint required com to be grown on exactly the 
number of acres enrolled in the commodity program less the set-aside under the acreage reduction and 
paid land diversion programs. When base flexibility provisions were included, lower deficiency 
payments were included and the restrictions on planted acres were relaxed accordingly. Participation 
on every acre of program base was not required. However, less than full participation will reduce the 
producers commodity program base in future years. A penalty on less than full participation was 
used simulate the furure loss of income in a static modelling framework. 
Estimates of revenue uncertainty faced by producers include both yield and product price 
variability. Contributions to yield variability from weather and pest infestation were considered. 
Constraints on land and acreage base, as well as seasonal restrictions on machinery and labor, were 
incorporated in the farm decision model. 
Model Specification, Data, and Assumptions 
In this section the process models used for the analysis are reviewed and the structures 
required for the evaluations of the base flexibility, the ban and the tax on com rootworm insecticide 
are developed. 
EPIC 
EPIC was calibrated to reflect farm-level yields and for simulating impacts of com rootworm 
infestation. Historical daily weather data for the years 1955-87 coupled with plot level experimental 
data on rootworm infestations and outcomes for the years 1977-84 in Nashua on com yield were used 
(Tollefson 1989). County average soybean, oat, and alfalfa hay yields for years 1977-87 were used 
to calibrate EPIC (Iowa Agricultural Statistics 1978-88). To the assess impacts of rootworms on com 
yields, EPIC was applied to estimate yield reductions for selected levels of damage. The rootworm 
damages were reflected in reduced daily water uptake. This approximation of damages was based on 
results of an EPA funded study on com rootworm insecticides (CARD and US EPA 1989). 
Four rootworm infestation levels were selected using the ISU root-rating system.' Following 
Tollefson (1989), ranges of root damage with ratings (1-3, 3-4, 4-5, 5-6) were mapped into four 
infestation levels (None, Low, Moderate, Heavy) with annual probabilities (0.1, 0.4, 0.4, 0.1). The 
estimation of the discrete probability distribution for infestation levels was based on Turpin et a!. 
( 1972) and experimental data from Nashua County on observed infestations and yield reductions 
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(Tollefson 1989). These experimental data were used to calibrate EPIC, and to simulate com yields 
for 33 years using the probabilities of infestation. Infestation levels were assumed temporally 
uncorrelated and independent of weather (Foster et al. 1986; Tollefson 1989). 
QRP 
The time series of yields from EPIC, together with the historical market prices, program 
parameters, and variable costs of production were used to estimate net returns per acre by production 
activiry and alternative infestation levels. A list of the production and commodity program activities 
that are modeled can be found in Table 1. Recall that only com following com rotations were subject 
to rootworm damage. Estimates of net returns were: 
' I: W, [YLD .. , • MP ~ - VC,.,] 
k•l J I} ~ 
where RPu is the net returns to production activiry j in year i (dollars per acre); Wi< is the relative 
' 
(4) 
share of crop k in the total rotation j( I: w, = l);YLD,. is the yield for crop k in rotation j in year i 
.t•l } 1 
(bushels per acre); MP~ is the market price of crop kin year i (dollars per bushel); and VC,i< is the 
variable. cost of crop kin rotation j in year i (dollars per acre). Expected net return for each of the 
production activities was approximated by taking the average over the 33 years. 
Historical market prices for each crop year (1955-87) were obtained from Futrell (1988). 
Relevant com program parameters for 1974-87 were from unpublished ASCS data (1989). Data on 
variable production costs for the crop sequences were from ISU Extension Budgets (Duffy 1987). All 
prices and costs were in 1987 dollars. Insecticide costs per acre were calculated using the price of 
Counter, the major com rootworm insecticide in Iowa (Wintersteen and Hartzler 1987). The label 
rate of one pound per acre was used. 
Since farmers know government program parameters before planting, the variabiliry of net 
returns to enrollment derives from uncertainry about market prices and yields. Although expectations 
of market prices are likely conditioned upon the level of the program parameters, estimation of this 
relationship is beyond the scope of this farm level analysis. Following McSweeny and Kramer 
(1986), the variabiliry of net returns to enrollment with certain program parameters, was 
approximated using the target price, loan rates, and paid land diversion payment rate for a single year 
( 1987). These parameters were deflated and used to calculate net returns to enrollment fc:ir each year 
from 1974 to 1987. Acreage reduction rates were also from (or the same as) 1987. 
The comrnodiry program benefits include deficiency payments, nonrecourse loan benefits, and 
paid land diversion payments. Returns from the market are fully captured in the returns of the 
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production activities and are not included in the calculation of benefits from the commodity program 
enrollment activities. The commodity program benefits were: 
RE, + {(1-ARP-PW) • YLD, • [MAX(LLR,,MPC,)-MPC,]} + 
{(1-ARP-PW) • [MAX(TG1>MAX(SAP,,NLR,),O)] • BYLD,} + (5) 
{PW • PWP. • BYLD .. }-(ARP +PW) • CVC I I} I 
where RE;; is the benefits received from participating in the corn program of sequence j in year i 
(dollars per acre of base); ARP is the 1987 set-aside required under the acreage reduction program 
(percent of total acres enrolled); PLD is the 1987 set-aside required under the voluntary paid land 
diversion program (percent of total acres enrolled); LLR; is the 1987 local Chickasaw county loan rate 
for com inflated to year i (dollars per bushel); MPC, is the real local market price for corn in year i 
(dollars per bushel); TGT, is the 1987 target price for com inflated to year i (dollars per bushel); 
SAP, is the real national season average market price used to determine the deficiency payments in 
year i (dollars per bushel); NLR; is the 1987 national average loan rate for corn inflated to year i 
(dollars per bushel); BYLD9 is the base yield established by the producer in year i for crop sequence j 
(bushels per acre); PLOP, is the 1987 paid land diversion payment rate inflated to year i (dollars per 
bushel); and CVC, is the real cost in year i of covering acres set-aside under the acreage reduction 
and paid land diversion programs (dollars per acre). Benefits vary by crop sequence only because 
yields and therefore program base yields vary by crop sequence. Expected net return to the 
enrollment activities was approximated by the average of all years. 
Less than full participation in the commodity programs for corn means fewer acres of corn 
planted and, because program base is a five-year moving average of planted acres, the program base 
in future years will be lowered. The estimation of the distributions of lost benefits for situations in 
which the nonparticipation in commodity programs reduced the base required the evaluation of the 
variability of future losses from base acreage reduction. Producers are faced with uncertainty about 
which programs will be implemented and what the values of the associated parameters will be in 
future years. To approximate the variability in the net present value of the stream of future losses, 
both sources of uncertainty should be considered. In practice, however, it is difficult to predict if 
government commodity programs will change in future years. Thus, only the latter was estimated 
using the actual parameter values for 1974-87. 
The net present value of annual benefits lost from a lower corn base was used to estimate the 
penalty for losing base. The lost benefits from an acre of established corn base was estimated as the 
return to an acre of corn in the program less the best nonprogram alternative: 
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BR,1 = {(1-ARP,-PW,) • YLDif * MAX(MPC,,LLR,)} + 
{ (1-ARP, -PW,) • BYLD if • MAX[TGJ; -MAX(SAP,,NLR,) ,0]} + 
{PW1 • PWP1 • BYLDif}-(ARP+PW) • CVC,-NBA1 
(6) 
where BR;; is the return to an acre of corn base above that of the best nonprogram alternative for 
sequence j in year i (dollars per acre); and NBA; is the return to the best nonprogram crop alternative 
in year i (dollars per acre). The penalty in (6) was calculated for each year as the net present value 
of the annual lost benefits (BR;;) in the five succeeding years. The discount factor was 8 percent. 
The values used to calculate the penalty reflect the current economic and political environment. 
Any policy changes may change the value of the penalty. Adding program base flexibility, for 
example, changes the stream of expected future benefits and therefore the penalty. Because the same 
penalty values were used in the model for evaluating each of the policies, the outcomes do not reflect 
the change in the penalty. 
Machinery and labor requirements were subdivided into four seasons: (I) April and May, (2) 
June and July, (3) August and September, and (4) October and November, and were obtained from 
CARD/SCS budgets. Estimates of machinery and labor availability were based on typical numbers of 
workers and machines for a representative Iowa farm, and average number of working hours per 
season (Iowa Agricultural Statistics 1978-88). Constraints on the level of corn base eligible for 
participation in the farm program were dependent upon the assumed percentage of total acres 
established as base. A constraint on the amount of rootworrn insecticide was also included to simulate 
the insecticide ban. 
Using a third-degree polynomial, net returns of production, program benefits, and lost future 
program benefits were regressed on time to detrend the series for the production, enrollment, and 
penalty activities. The detrended data were used to estimate the variance-covariance matrix. Thus, it 
was implicitly assumed that in practice, farmers are generally aware of long-run trends in net returns 
and only the deviations from the long-term trend are considered random or unpredictable. The 
calculated variance-covariance matrix and the expected net returns for the production activities and 
selected enrollment and penalty activities are presented in Table I. 
Several observations can be made from Table I. The rotations (CC) and (CCS) with insecticide 
applications dominate the same rotations without insecticides. Accounting for insecticide costs 
(s8/acre for CC and s:2.33/acre for CCS), the expected net returns of (CC) and (CCS) with 
insecticides are higher by 35 percent and 7 percent than those without insecticides. Moreover, the 
variances of net returns for these rotations with insecticides are lower by 36 percent and 3 percent 
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than those without insecticides. Consequently, (CC) and (CCS) without insecticides will be in the 
optimal QRP solution only if their insecticide using counterparts are constrained or made less 
profitable. 
Net rerurns of the production and the participation activities are negatively correlated (Table 1 ). 
In general, the hlgher the share of corn in the rotation, the more negative the correlation. Thus, 
enrollment in the government program for corn leads to a reduction in risk. 
The penalty activities are negatively correlated with the production activities and positively 
correlated with the program participation activities. Thls follows from the fact that higher rerurns to 
enrollment in the corn program are associated with higher opportunity costs for loss of base acres. 
The covariances among the program participation activities, which all included corn and were subject 
to the same weather conditions, were always positive. The rotations including alfalfa hay had 
relatively small covariances with the other rotations. They also had the lowest variances, which 
tended to increase their attractiveness as the level of risk aversion increased. 
Empirical Findings and Policy Implications 
The standard for comparison, the baseline, reflects the more inflexible corn program of the 
past. In the baseline, the target price was set at the 1987 level of $3.03 per bushel, whlle the acreage 
reduction rate (ARP) was 20 percent and the paid land diversion (PLD) was 10 percent. Also, 65 
percent of the 350 total representative farm acres (228 acres), was assumed eligible for enrollmem in 
the corn program. The cost of corn rootworm insecticide was $8.00 per pound of active ingredient. 
To empirically investigate the role of risk aversion, nine levels of the Arrow-Pratt risk aversion 
coefficient, a, ranging from a = 0.0000 (risk neutral) to a = 0.0004 were simulated.' Sensitivity 
analyses were performed for the target price, the ARP set-aside rate and corn base acreage. 
Additional analyses involving the target price and ARP set-aside rate provided an opportunity to 
investigate the possibility of compensating producers for the insecticide ban by offering additional 
program benefits. Altogether, the QRP was solved 296 times. 
Insecticide Ban 
Figure 2 illustrates that a complete ban on rootworm insecticide application would substantially 
reduce the expected utility of the farmer and that the reduction would vary significantly depending on 
attirude toward risk. For a given constant level of expected rerum, the variability of rerurns under the 
ban increased relative to the baseline. Thls increase in variability holds for all levels of risk aversion, 
and is most notable at hlgher levels. For example, differences in expected utility between the ban and 
no ban with inflexible commodity programs and the ban and no ban with flexible commodity 
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programs were 2.3 percent and 2.8 percent for a risk neutral farmer (a = 0.0). Comparable values 
for a more risk averse farmer, with a = 0.0004, are 16.7 percent and 21.7 percent (Figure 3). 
The frontier in Figure 2 for the ban with the inflexible commodity program is clearly always on 
or above the frontier for the ban under the flexible commodity program. The position of frontiers in 
Figure 2 demonstrate how flexibility in the commodity programs reduced the negative impact of a 
com rootworm insecticide ban. The extent of the reduction in expected utility varied from 0.5 
percent for risk neutral producers to 7. 7 percent for producers with the highest risk aversion 
coefficient (Figure 4). Clearly, the combination of inflexible commodity programs and a restrictive 
pesticide policy decreased producers' expected utility more than flexible commodity programs with 
the same policy, especially if risk aversion is high. This result suggests that increased flexibility might 
be tied with a ban or partial ban on the use of com rootworm insecticides as a way of compensating 
farmers for associated income loss. 
Producer responses to a ban under flexible and inflexible commodity programs are at least 
partially indicated by the changes in the mix of crops grown. The area planted to com generally 
diminished and the area planted to other crops increased with the ban. And the magnitude of these 
changes was larger with flexible commodity programs. Corresponding to the reduction in com acres, 
the change in commodity program participation fell more when the com rootworm ban was imposed 
with flexible commodity programs than with inflexible programs. These outcomes would hold for all 
levels of risk aversion. For example, with the ban and a=0.0002, the flexible base policy resulted in 
11 percent (136 to 121 acres) fewer com acres and about the same percentage reduction in com 
enrolled in the program. This result is compared with no reduction under the inflexible commodity 
program. 
Taxing Insecticides 
In Figure 5, the E-V frontiers under a 100 percent tax with flexible and inflexible commodity 
programs are above the frontiers for the baseline, and flexible commodity program with no tax. But 
the observed change in expected utility was less than 3 percent for all levels of risk aversion. 
Moreover, a tax at either 50 or 100 percent was an ineffective policy instrument for reducing the use 
of insecticides. Likewise, the role of flexibility in the commodity program was limited in the case of 
the tax. With either tax level, the differences in the objective function values between flexible and 
inflexible commodity programs were never greater than 1.5 percent. Hence, taxes at these levels did 
not alter producer behavior or use of insecticides under either flexible or inflexible commodity 
programs. The taxes simply reduced the farmers' expected utility, a transfer of income that did not 
disturb allocation decisions. 
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Commodity Program Flexibility and Environmental Policy 
To the extent that inflexibility in the commodity program for com encourages chemically 
intensive com production, flexibility may allow diversity and reduce the demand for chemicals. This 
outcome was not the case when the percentage of total acres and program parameters were set at the 
baseline levels. Figure 6 shows that the flexibility caused no change in insecticide use from the 
baseline. When, however, the farm was assumed to have 80 percent of the total crop land established 
as com base, there was a 5 percent reduction (164 to 156 pounds) in insecticide use. In this case, the 
historically established base acreage available for participation (280 acres) was 3. 7 percent greater 
than the optimal within the inflexible commodity programs (270 acres). When a target price of $2.50 
per bushel was assumed, flexibility induced a 41 percent reduction ( 118 to 70 pounds) in insecticide 
use from the baseline. The available base acres for participation (228 acres) were larger than what 
was optimal with the lower target price and flexible commodity programs (187 acres). Thus, there 
are circumstances, in terms of base acres and target price, that make flexibility in the commodity 
programs effective in reducing the use of com rootworm insecticides. Generally, the lower the target 
price and the higher the rate of base to total acres, the more effective flexibility options were in 
reducing rootworm insecticide use. 
In addition to the potentially positive environmental impacts of the flexible base, the policy also 
relaxes a potentially significant constraint on producer decisions. Hence, increases in both producer 
expected utility and adjustments in the crop mix are likely. 
Percentage changes in the optimal value of the objective function induced by a flexible base are 
summarized in Figure 4 across selected levels of risk aversion for baseline levels of program 
parameters and in Figure 7 for selected levels of program parameters at one level of risk aversion. It 
can be seen that base flexibility always left unchanged or increased the objective function value. 
Generally, the negative impact of the inflexibility on the farmer's expected utility increased with the 
risk aversion coefficient. For baseline levels of program parameters without a ban, there was no 
increase of expected utility except at the highest level of risk aversion where a 1.2 percent increase is 
observed. In Figure 7 positive differences of .2 and 2 percent are shown when 80 percent of 
cropland is assumed to be the established base and when the target prices is set to $2.50 per bushel. 
In general, flexibility had more of an impact on the objective function value when a higher percentage 
of cropland is established as base, the target price is lower and the ARP rate is higher. These results 
are also illustrated in Figures 2 and 8, which show the E-V frontiers for the inflexible commodity 
program situations overlay or are positioned above the frontiers with flexible commodity programs 
for the alternatives. 
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The gaps between the E-V frontiers under the inflexible and flexible commodity program 
alternatives increased with the level of risk aversion. In addition, the gaps, given the ban, were 
larger than when no ban was imposed. Comparisons of Figures 2 and 8 show that base flexibility 
increased producer expected utility more as the percent of total acres eligible for participation 
increased, especially under the ban. Flexible commodity programs were favorable with a relatively 
high levels of established base. When the target price was reduced to $2.50 per bushel, compared 
with the baseline of $3.03, the impact of flexible commodity programs for on expected utility also 
increased. A similar comparison between the baseline results and the lower ARP set-aside rate 
showed that the impact of flexibility was minimal. 
Sensitivity of Results to Program Parameters 
Comparison of Figures 2 and 8 demonstrates the interaction between commodity programs for 
different assumptions on the level of program base acres and com rootworm policies. What is 
important for impacts of flexibility is not so much the absolute percentage of total cropland in the 
base, but the percentage relative to com acreage the farmer would produce, given current 
circumstances. The level of established base may differ from the optimum with commodity program 
flexibility, because the base is established historically under a nonflexible program. In Figure 2, the 
frontier for the ban with the inflexible commodity program lies to the left and above the frontier for 
the ban with the flexible commodity program at most levels of risk aversion. The estimated reduction 
in expected utility from the ban was even greater with inflexible commodity programs than with 
flexible programs when 80 percent of cropland was com base (Figure 8). The divergence is widest 
for producers with higher risk aversion. 
As expected, the results demonstrate that insecticide applications followed com acreage closely. 
As the returns to the commodity program increased and more com was grown, more rotations with 
com following com (CC and CCS) were employed. The higher the level of base acres, the larger 
were the quantities of insecticides applied. With 50, 65, and 80 percent of total acres in the com 
base, 65, 118, and 164 pounds of active ingredient were applied with inflexible commodity programs. 
These changes in the quantities of insecticides applied resulted from changes in acres treated at a 
constant rate. 
As the target price was lowered from of $3.03 to $2.50 per bushel, area planted in com under 
the flexible commodity program decreased from 148 to 121 acres, resulting in a decrease of 
insecticide applications from 118 to 70 pounds of active ingredient. The opposite was observed for 
the lower ARP or set-aside. As ARP was lowered from 20 to 10 percent, area planted to com and 
the quantities of insecticides applied increased from 148 to 171 acres and from 118 to 140 pounds. 
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The sensitivity of impacts of the corn rootwonn insecticide ban for expected utility given 
changes in base acres, target price, and ARP or set-aside was also examined. As expected, it was 
found that the greater the opportunity to take advantage of the commodity program (larger base), the 
greater the benefit of participating (higher target price), and the lower the costs of participating (lower 
ARP set-aside), the greater the adverse impact of the insecticide ban for farmer expected utility. The 
importance of corn base acreage is easily demonstrated. For a = 0.0002, the impact of an 
insecticide ban on certainty equivalent farm income varied from 6.3 percent with 50 percent of the 
total acres as base, in both inflexible and flexible commodity program alternatives, to 20 percent and 
12.8 percent with inflexible and flexible commodity programs and an 80 percent corn base. 
Comparisons of Figures 2 and 8 also demonstrates that the higher the base-to-total-acres ratio, the 
greater the impact of the insecticide ban on expected utility. The fanners with a higher share of base 
acres were penalized most, especially when commodity programs are inflexible. 
The relationship of the target price to the ban and expected utility of fanners can be 
demonstrated by comparing the baseline ($3.03) to the lower target price ($2.50). For a = 0.0002, 
the 5.1 and 9. 9 percent reductions for the ban compared with no ban under the lower target price for 
the flexible and inflexible commodity program alternatives, are significantly smaller than the ll.8 and 
15.1 percent reductions for the baseline. Increasing target prices increased expected utility at a 
slower rate when a ban is imposed compared to the baseline (Figure 9). A similar comparison 
between the baseline and assumed lower ARP rates showed that adverse impacts of the ban on 
expected utility decreased with the level of ARP. As the ARP set-aside requirement increased, 
expected utility declined at a slower rate when a ban was imposed compared to the baseline (Figure 
10). 
Comparisons of the total area planted for corn, the amount of insecticide applied, the expected 
utility under the baseline, and elimination of the program yielded notable results. When the 
commodity program was eliminated altogether, the total of corn acreage decreased further and the 
area planted to other crops increased. The percentage decrease in the area of corn grown from the 
baseline (148 acres) to no program (116 acres) was 22 percent. Similarly, the percentage reduction in 
the total amount of insecticides applied from the baseline to the no-program alternative was more than 
70 percent (ll8 to 35 pounds). These results provide finn support for the argument that the 
government corn program encourages continuous cropping and use of rootwonn insecticides. Note, 
however, that the variability of net returns increased sharply in the absence of the program (Figure 
ll). Similar to Musser and Stamoulis (1981), program participation dominated nonparticipation. 
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Conclusions 
This analysis has shown a number of opportunities for coordinating commodity and 
environmental policy. Base flexibility relaxes a constraint for producer behavior and increases 
expected utility, especially with an insecticide ban. The policy implication is that increased base 
flexibility can be tied to a ban or a partial ban on com rootwonn insecticides as a way of 
compensating fanners for associated income loss. In this capacity, base flexibility is more beneficial 
to risk averse producers, and to producers with high com base to the acreage ratio. The target price 
also can be increased to compensate fanners for an insecticide ban. Values of the target price and 
ARP that leave fanners equally well off with a com rootwonn insecticide ban can be determined 
easily. 
The greater the opportunity to take advantage of the commodity program (larger established 
base), the greater the benefits of participating (higher target price) and the lower the cost of 
participating (lower ARP set-aside), the larger the quantities of insecticides applied. Because 
opportunities to use lower chemical application rates were not modeled, the amount of insecticide 
applied followed closely the acreage planted to com. Flexibility reduced the use of com rootworm 
insecticides. The impact was less noticeable with high base, high target prices, and a low ARP. If 
the government's commodity programs for com were eliminated, insecticide use and com acreage on 
the representative farm would drop significantly. 
Attitude toward risk was a key variable influencing policy outcomes. Risk averse producers 
seem to benefit substantially more from higher commodity program benefits. These differences are of 
such magnitude that they should be considered in fashioning com programs that encourage 
environmental restrictions, such as the flexibility target price ARP ban trade-off suggested above. 
Clearly, there are opportunities for modifying the use of pesticide chemicals through the 
government's commodity programs. These opportunities will likely arise during the debate over the 
1995 Farm Bill. The outcomes of this analysis suggest that exploring the interrelationships between 
U.S. government commodity programs and environmental policies and outcomes will be tremendously 
rewarding. The results presented here are for the farm level. Broader implications for commodity 
prices and other feedbacks to producer decisions are extensions of this work, and as foundations for a 
more solid basis for designing commodity programs to meet environmental, income, and stability 
targets for the U.S. agricultural sector. 
.----------------------· 
' ' 
: Exptrinenlal tw:f ; 
' ' I ~ Com lfoolwonn 1 
: i 
: .htMtatkw /trJbllbJitJ9s : 
' ' 
' ' 
' ' ~---------------------~ 
·---------------------
' ' 
' ' 
: l6lorlc6JI Mlilw8w \ 
' ' 
: PM~etns, Crop : 
' ' 
' ' 
' 
' : 
' 
' 
' ' L--------------------~ 
• CUmlnl u.s. Commodity Prognun For Com 
• l'lonl1ngf1exbllty-
• ~SBn&fl\.elnpu/Tu. 
r--------- ---------1 
: $/multJifld YIBid i 
1----11 ... ~: ~klr i 
... ~llobtllomt : 
' 
and lnl8slallon8 : 
' ' ~-------------------J 
Figure 1. Representative Farm Simulation Model 
r ------------------------· 
: Sknu/IJifld NBI /I8IIJim \ 
' ' 
' ' 
I lJislriiJuiJom for ~1)Mt 1 1-----~ : 
: Rolallons, /n/'Bsls/lon$, IJnd )-
: PolcyAAr/m.61/t,M : 
' ' 
' ' L-------------------------~ 
.--
' ' 
' ' 1 R/sk~ I 
: : 
' Utnd Endowrntlnl ' 
', ' 
. :-----
: Altlchh«y IJnd : 
: Ubor ConslnJ/nl:t : 
' ' L _________________ ; 
' 
Qusdmllc-
Aiodot 
C/Ningtls ;, lnHclicldB and 
NlrogBn llse, Prrxlucflr WBA&m, 
Crop .. !lola/Jon Ss/Bc/lon and 
PIHtJcJp#IIJon ;, u.s. Commodity 
PrognunkxCom 
------------------
16 
22 
20 
18 
18 
14 
12 
10L__L __ L__L __ L__L __ L__L~ 
~ ~ ro ~ M ~ ~ ~ -
--
-) 
- Bsss/ine/F/exib/9 BBss + BBssline/lnHsxibility 
_.,_ BBn/F/exib/9 BBss ~ BBn/lnllsxibility 
Figure 2. Comparison of E-V Frontiers: Baseline to Ban, with Flexible and Inflexible Commodity 
Programs 
Absolute Risk AvetS!on Coemclent !ill-·--
Figure 3. Percent<'ge Change in Objective Function Value Induced by Ban on Com Roorworm 
Insecticide 
Percentage Change 
".---~----~------------------, 
• 
Absolute Risk A vetS/on Coefficient 
l'ill] ........... 
17 
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Table I. Variance-Covariance Matrix and ExEected Net Returns for the Baseline 
Activity 
Activity # 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Variance ~ Covariance 
cc cc ccs ccs cs CSOLL COLLL PROGRAM PROGRAM PENALTY PENALTY 
NOINF INF NO INF lNF C FL S CFLC C FL S C FL C NO 
NO INF INF 
772 
2 8281 12154 
3 6433 6744 5829 6137 
4 6317 7730 5829 6137 
5 5895 6119 5749 5653 5811 
6 3665 3492 3519 3372 3547 2396 
7 1031 588 1262 1171 1422 1304 1530 
8 -1675 -2036 -1011 -1078 -700 -446 -17 1481 
9 -1681 -2039 -1014 -1080 -701 -448 -19 1486 1491 
10 -195 -42 -199 -194 -288 -216 -220 59 59 155 
11 -265 -284 -239 -272 -285 -208 -169 118 118 100 75 
Expected Returns 
($/Acre) 
250.48 179.69 246.51 227.12 234.71 179.12 169.54 153.10 152.94 -76.68 -45.09 
INF = Subject to insect infestation C =Com 0 = Oats 
FL = Following S = Soybeans L = Legume hay 
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ENDNOTES 
1. Iowa State University has developed a root damage rating scale from 1 to 6 for larval feeding. 
The rating scale is defined as follows: 1 when no damage or only a few minor feeding scars are 
evident, 2 when feeding scars are evident but no roots have been eaten to within 1 112 inches of the 
plant, 3 when several roots have been eaten to within 1 1/2 inches of the plant but the equivalent of 
an entire node of roots has not been destroyed, 4 when one node of roots has been completely 
destroyed, 5 when two nodes of roots have been completely destroyed, and 6 when three or more 
nodes of roots have been destroyed. 
2. Due to seasonal constraints on labor and machinery, levels of a > 0.0004 resulted in idled 
acreage beyond that required for government program enrollment. Since cropland is typically fully 
utilized in the study area, solutions for higher levels of a were not considered. 
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